Before joining ACU, I was a postdoc at the University of Notre Dame, where I worked as the Managing Editor for Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. I received my Ph.D. in 2017 from the Philosophy Department at Notre Dame, with a graduate minor in History and Philosophy of Science. Prior to that, I received an M.A. in Philosophy from Western Michigan University and a B.A. in Humanities and Peace & Conflict Studies from Messiah College.
My research interests include epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and ethics. I have published papers on Bayesian confirmation theory, explanatory inference, the use of intuitions in philosophy, and the problem of evil.
I am currently working on two main research programs. The first defends infallibilism about knowledge, according to which we know all and only those propositions that are certain for us. I see knowledge, so understood, as playing a foundational role in determining the rationality of belief, in that we ought to be confident in a proposition to the extent that it is made probable by what we know. My second research program examines the nature of this probabilistic support relation, and how we can determine the values of probabilities.
‘Infinite Value and the Best of All Possible Worlds’. Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: 1-26.
‘Intuitions Are Used as Evidence in Philosophy’, Mind 127 no.1 (2018): 69-104.
‘Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent’, Journal of Philosophy 114 no. 5 (2017): 251-273.
‘How Explanation Guides Confirmation’, Philosophy of Science 84 no. 2 (2017): 359-368.
‘A Problem for the Alternative Difference Measure of Confirmation’, Philosophical Studies 164 no. 3 (2013): 643-651.